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snake in question was doubtless so called owing to the
rapidity of its movements. Through this passage, the term in
the Chinese has now come to be used in the sense of
"military maneuvers."]
Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its
tail; strike at its tail, and you will be attacked by its
head; strike at its middle, and you will be attacked
by head and tail both.
30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the SHUAI-
JAN,
[That is, as Mei Yao-ch`en says, "Is it possible to make
the front and rear of an army each swiftly responsive to
attack on the other, just as though they were part of a single
living body?"]
I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men
of Yueh are enemies;
[Cf. VI. ss. 21.]
yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and
are caught by a storm, they will come to each
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other's assistance just as the left hand helps the
right.
[The meaning is: If two enemies will help each other in a
time of common peril, how much more should two parts of
the same army, bound together as they are by every tie of
interest and fellow-feeling. Yet it is notorious that many a
campaign has been ruined through lack of cooperation,
especially in the case of allied armies.]
31. Hence it is not enough to put one's trust in the
tethering of horses, and the burying of chariot
wheels in the ground
[These quaint devices to prevent one's army from
running away recall the Athenian hero Sophanes, who
carried the anchor with him at the battle of Plataea, by
means of which he fastened himself firmly to one spot. [See
Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not enough, says Sun Tzu, to render
flight impossible by such mechanical means. You will not
succeed unless your men have tenacity and unity of
purpose, and, above all, a spirit of sympathetic cooperation.
This is the lesson which can be learned from the SHUAI-
JAN.]
32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set
up one standard of courage which all must reach.
[Literally, "level the courage [of all] as though [it were
that of] one." If the ideal army is to form a single organic
whole, then it follows that the resolution and spirit of its
component parts must be of the same quality, or at any rate
must not fall below a certain standard. Wellington's
seemingly ungrateful description of his army at Waterloo as
"the worst he had ever commanded" meant no more than
that it was deficient in this important particular unity of
spirit and courage. Had he not foreseen the Belgian
defections and carefully kept those troops in the
background, he would almost certainly have lost the day.]
33. How to make the best of both strong and weak that
is a question involving the proper use of ground.
[Mei Yao-ch`en's paraphrase is: "The way to eliminate
the differences of strong and weak and to make both
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serviceable is to utilize accidental features of the ground."
Less reliable troops, if posted in strong positions, will hold
out as long as better troops on more exposed terrain. The
advantage of position neutralizes the inferiority in stamina
and courage. Col. Henderson says: "With all respect to the
text books, and to the ordinary tactical teaching, I am
inclined to think that the study of ground is often overlooked,
and that by no means sufficient importance is attached to
the selection of positions . and to the immense advantages
that are to be derived, whether you are defending or
attacking, from the proper utilization of natural features." [2]]
34. Thus the skillful general conducts his army just as
though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by
the hand.
[Tu Mu says: "The simile has reference to the ease with
which he does it."]
35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus
ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain
order.
36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by
false reports and appearances,
[Literally, "to deceive their eyes and ears."]
and thus keep them in total ignorance.
[Ts`ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms:
"The troops must not be allowed to share your schemes in
the beginning; they may only rejoice with you over their
happy outcome." "To mystify, mislead, and surprise the
enemy," is one of the first principles in war, as had been
frequently pointed out. But how about the other process the
mystification of one's own men? Those who may think that
Sun Tzu is over-emphatic on this point would do well to read
Col. Henderson's remarks on Stonewall Jackson's Valley
campaign: "The infinite pains," he says, "with which Jackson [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]